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ABSTRACT
While the U.S. and Sweden both lost more than 20 per cent of their shares
of world and developed countries' exports of manufactures over the 15 years or
so after the mid-1960's, the export shares of their multinational firms stayed
fairly stable or even increased. The multinationals, while first increasing
and then holding fairly constant their shares of exports by their home
countries, raised the proportion of their worldwide exports that they supplied
from their overseas affiliates. These developments suggest that the declining
trade shares of the U.S. and Sweden were not due mainly to deterioration in
the innovatjveness or inventiveness of American and Swedish firms or declines
in their management ability or in their technological capabilities, but rather
to economic developments in the firms' home countries.
The finding that firms have done better as exporters than their home
countries is strengthened when we look at different industry groups. In both
the U.S. and Sweden, and in all industry groups, with one exception, the
multinationals' export shares increased relative to those of their home
countries. The margins were often wide, and were mostly larger for Swedish
firms than for U.S. firms.
In general, though the basic story was quite similar for the U.S. and
Sweden, there were some notable differences. One was that the share of exports
originating in affiliates was lower for Sweden than for the U.S. To a large
extent, this difference in the siting of export production reflected the much
greater export orientation of Swedish parents relative to U.S. parents, presu-
mably a consequence of the relatively small size of the Swedish domestic
market. Another difference between U.S. and Swedish multInationals was that
while the U.S. firms' share in world manufacturing exports remained stable
over the studied period, the Swedish firms' share rose by 14 per cent. We are
so far not in a position to say whether this was because Swedish firms
increased their competitiveness more than U.S. firms or because there was a
higher conversion of Swedish firms into multinational status.
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Introduction
Most governments worry about the competitiveness of their economies, and
Sweden and the U.S. are no exceptions, particularly since they have bothgone
through episodes in which their shares in world trade have declined sharply.
Trade theory traditionally assigns the responsibility for such changes to
macroeconomic developments such as inflationary monetary policy or expansive
fiscal policy. There is also another strand of literature that attributes
these changes to more "structural" characteristics of an economy, in the sense
that they are more deeply imbedded and long-term, and not subject to manipula-
tion by macroeconomic policy. These include the income elasticity of demand
for the country's products and changes in the productivity of the country and
its firms relative to that of their competitors. Some recent discussions of
U.S. trade problems have emphasized factors of the second type, in particular
supposed changes in the character of U.S. firms, such as deteriorations in
*Valuable comments and suggestions were received from Asim Erdilek at a
session of the Western Economic Association and from Birgitta Swedenborg,
Lennart Ohlsson, and other participants in seminars at the Industriens
Utredningsinstitut and the Sveriges Industriförbund in Stockholm. We are gra-
teful to Linda Molinari for programming and statistical work and Rosa
Schupbach and James Hayes for the preparation of the manuscript.
Robert Lipsey's participation in this project was supported by a
Fulbright—SSRC grant and a PSC-CUNY research grant and facilitated by a grant
of computer time from the CUNY computer center. We are most appreciative of
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hospitality during a series of visits to Sweden by Robert Lipsey and of
assistance by Kerstin Wennberg in the use of their data. Magnus Blomström's
work on this project was done while he was a member of the staff of the IUI.—2—
their innovativeness or inventiveness, in their management abilities, and -in
theirtechnological capabilities (See e.g. Abernathy et al., 1983, and
Thurow, 1985).
This last type of competitive factor has been given a somewhat different
role in recent literature on direct investment. These are the elements of the
competitiveness and comparative advantage of individual firms that enable them
to produce outside their own countries in competition with local firms that
presumably have the advantage of knowledge of local markets and the favor of
local consumers and governments. Thus, these elements of competitiveness and
comparative advantage are treated in the literature on multinationals as
belonging to firms rather than countries, and as being readily transferable by
firms from country to country within the firm (See e.g. Dunning, 1981). The
more transferable these attributes are geographically, the less they can be
the basis for national competitiveness and comparative advantage.
An implication for national trade policy is that factors that contribute
to firm competitiveness and comparative advantage will not necessarily contri-
bute to national competitiveness and comparative advantage. Subsidies to
R & 0, to innovation, or to management or technical training may enhance the
competitiveness of national firms in world markets, but that competitiveness
may be exploited by producing outside the home country.
A corresponding implication is that the factors producing firm com-
parative advantages should be studied by examining measures of the com-
petitiveness and comparative advantage of firms rather than that of their home
countries. And any large difference between the trade performance of a country
and that of the firms based in it helps us to determine whether the respon--3—
sibility for changes lies with macroeconomic policy or with the determinants
of firm advantages such as management or technology.
A simple illustration of this distinction and of the pattern of
ownership and location of production expected from it is presented in the
diagram below for the U.S. and Sweden alone. Country comparative advantage
is shown on the horizontal axis, and company comparative advantage on the
vertical axis, and the arrows show increasing comparative advantage.













The combination of U.S. country and U.S. company comparative advantage
results in home production by U.S. companies while the combination of
Swedish country and company comparative advantage results in home produc-
tion by Swedish companies. The combination of U.S. company comparative
advantage with a location advantage for Sweden as a country results in pro-
duction in Sweden by U.S.-owned companies while the combination of Swedish
company comparative advantage with location advantage for the U.S. results




might rest on factor abundance or prices or on access to that country's
market or closeness to other markets.
There are various ways we could observe U.S. and Swedish competitiveness
and comparative advantage and those of their firms, and compare them with
those of the world as a whole or of particular countries. We could compare
U.S. and Swedish shares in world production or exports, shares of the two
countries as exporters to particular markets, or shares of U.S. and Swedish
firms as producers in or exporters from individual country markets. In the
last case, we could be comparing the two countries' firms, holding constant
the characteristics of the country in which the production is located.
In this paper we have concentrated on competition on the world market and
comparisons with the world as a whole and developed countries as a group. And
we have measured competitiveness and comparative advantage by exports rather
than by production.
The main advantage of using exports rather than production for this pur-
pose is that exports are somewhat more footloose. A country has more power to
determine which producers supply its home market than which supply export
markets. We suspect, therefore, that shares in export markets represent the
underlying advantages of firms to a greater degree than do shares in domestic
markets.
That is not to say that export markets are unaffected by government
interventions or other non-economic factors. There have been many complaints
in the U.S. about export requirements and subsidies imposed on or offered to
U.S. affiliates, especially in developing countries. It is more that these
export promoting policies are circumscribed by the ability of companies to—5—
move their export production to other locations, if the policies impose too
large costs on them, and by the watchfulness of other countries over their
home and export markets.
Ideally, we should examine a variety of measures of firms'
competitiveness. A drawback of the export measure is that it ignores differen-
ces in the tradability of products. The skills of U.S. food companies in
advertising and promotion that enable them to operate in many countries are
probably undervalued by this measure because the products are traded very
little. Measures of production, consumption, or employment shares might
reflect some of these advantages better but have drawbacks of their own,
including greater difficulty in assembling comparable data and the greater
susceptibility of production for the host-country market to manipulation by
government interventions.
There are several advantages of using the U.S. and Sweden for comparative
study. The two countries are similar in several respects. Both are highly
industrialized and are homes to major multinational firms. In both countries,
these firms account for large shares of manufacturing industry and trade.
Furthermore, the trade of both countries is biased toward high R & 0
industries. Finally, both countries provide us with comprehensive data on the
activities of their multinationals.1
There are also some major differences between the U.S. and Sweden that
should be noted. Swedish firms are typically smaller when they venture abroad
for the first time than are American firms, Swedish multinationals supply
their foreign markets from their home production to a much greater extent than
U.S. direct investment abroad are mainly from the 1957, 1966,
1977, and 1982 surveys of U.S. multinational enterprises (U.S. Department of
Commerce, 1960, 1975, 1981, and 1985). The data on Swedish foreign investment
come from the Industriens Utredningsinstitut (IUI) of Stockholm and have been-6-
do U.S. multinationals, and import very little from their foreign manufac-
turing operations (Swedenborg, 1979, Chapter 3). Some of these differences
reflect the fact that the Swedish home market is so much smaller than the U.S.
market--no more than 3 or 4 per cent in population or income. There are also
substantial differences between Sweden and the U.S. with respect to policy
towards multinationals. The Swedish government has regulated both outward and
inward foreign investment much more directly than the U.S. government. In
particular, Swedish firms have been prohibited since the early 1970s from
financing their foreign subsidiaries with Swedish capital. No similar regula-
tions have governed U.S. firms for most of the period.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. First we examine the
international competitiveness of the U.S. and Sweden and of their firms for
manufacturing industries as a whole and then for broad industry groups. We
continue by characterizing the comparative advantages of U.S. and Sweden and
of U.S. and Swedish multinationals and analyze changes in these comparative
advantages. Finally, we discuss some implications of our findings.
analyzed in a series of volumes by Birgitta Swedenborg (1973, 1979, and 1982).
The IUI has completed four surveys of Swedish multinationals covering 1965,
1970, 1974, and 1978. In general, the surveys are comparable, but there -is a
difference in the definition of a multinational enterprise which should be
mentioned. In the Swedish data, parents must have majority-owned production
affiliates abroad in order to be included in the sample. The U.S. surveys, on
the other hand, use a broader definition, including also firms with only
minority interests and/or sales affiliates abroad. For 1970, when information
based on the broader definition is available also for Sweden, the firms
excluded by the narrower definition accounted for some 25 per cent of exports
from Sweden by Swedish parent firms. This means that we understate the role
of multinationals in Swedish exports as compared with that of U.S. multina-
tionals in U.S. exports. And -if there was a shift among Swedish firms from
having only sales affiliates abroad into production abroad, it would











aRatio comparable to 1957












There was a temporary reversal of the decline in the case of the U.S. between
1978 and 1982, but none for Sweden. One can think of these declines as
reflecting to a large extent, the declines of Swedish and U.S. shares of world
output. The Swedish share of output fell by almost 20 per cent relative to
2This definition of competitiveness is questionable for a number of
reasons (see Lipsey, 1984). However, for our purpose here of comparing the
performance of countries and their firms, we think it is a reasonable approxi-
mation.
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The International Competitiveness of the U.S. and Sweden and of Their Firms
The U.S. and Sweden both declined in competitiveness from the mid-1960's
to the early 1980's, if we define competitiveness as shares of world or deve-
loped country exports.2 Swedish export shares declined by about 26 -29per
cent between 1965 and 1982, while the U.S. shares fell by 15 -19per cent

















and Industrial Country Output
Industrial
World Country
U.S. Sweden U.S. Sweden
1960 31.4 1.04 43.8 1.45
1965 30.9 1.05 42.9 1.46
1970 27.7 .99 39.1 1.39
1975 25.8 .94 37.7 1.37
1980 25.0 .82 37.5 1.23
Source: Appendix Table S-4
the world and 13 per cent relative to industrial countries in the 15 years
from 1965 to 1980, while the U.S. shares fell by 22 and 16 per cent.
In contrast to the decline in country competitiveness, the shares in
world exports of firms based in the two countries fell by much less and the
shares of their multinational firms stayed fairly steady or even increased.
Shares (%)ofMultinational Firms,
including Majority-Owned Affiliates










Source: Lipsey and Kravis (1986) and Appendix Table S-2
U.S. multinationals' share in world exports was virtually unchanged over
16 years while the U.S. share fell by 18 per cent. Swedish multinationals'
share rose by 14 per cent in 13 years while the share of Sweden itself fell by
20 per cent. In the last four years, there was some decline for Swedish multi——9-
nationals, but it was smaller than that for Sweden.
A change in the share of multinationals can take place in two ways. One is
a shift of firms into or out of multinational status. The other is a change in
the competitiveness of those firms that are initially multinational and remain
so. The population of U.S. parent firms was stable, or even declined slightly
between 1966 and 1977, and then declined substantially between 1977 and 1982
(Lipsey and Kravis, 1986, Table U-b). Thus, for the U.S., the stability or
rise in the competitiveness of multinationals was not the result of a movement
into multinational operations by firms that had not been multinational before.
For Sweden, the story is not so clear. The number of Swedish firms with
production affiliates abroad rose from 82 in 1966 to 118 in 1978 (Swedenborg,
1982, Table 3,2, p. 38). Of these, 47 were in the group continuously. Another
17 disappeared, but in effect remained because they were merged into other
firms in the multinational group. There were about 40 genuine disappearances
and 94 new entrants to the multinational class, a number that suggests the
possibility that the aggregate was substantially affected by the conversion of
firms to multinational status.
That question can be at least partially resolved by comparing these
measures of competitiveness for all Swedish multinationals with corresponding
ones for a fixed group of the largest multinationals:- 10-
1965 1978 1983
Parent Exports as % of World Exports
All Swedish multinationals 1.45 1.49 NA
28 firms 1.09 1.07 1.07
Parent Exports as 6 of DC Exports
All Swedish multinationals 1.60 1.68 NA
28 firms 1.20 1.20 1.26
Parent and Majority-owned Affil. Exports
asof World Exp.
All Swedish multinationals 1.62 1.84 NA
28 firms 1.21 1.32 NA
Source: Appendix Tables S-2 and S-3
From these data it appears that changes in the status of firms do not account
for the rising share of multinationals. The stability or rise in com-
petitiveness for the fixed panel of 28 firms is similar to the trend for all
Swedish multinationals, partly because these 28 are the larger firms. The
trend for these 28 firms may tend to be tilted upward because they have
absorbed other multinationals during the period, but it is diluted, on the
other hand, by the absorption of non—multinational firms. We cannot say,
therefore, without a more detailed study, whether mergers raise or lower the
trend for these firms.
The similarity in the experience of Swedish and U.S. multinationals extends
to the shares of home-country exports. These rose in both countries from the— 11—











Source:Lipsey and Kravis (1986) and Appendix Tables S—2 and S-3
mid—1960's to the late 1970's. The 28—firm data for Sweden show a continuation
of that rise through 1983, but the aggregate data for the U.S. show a decline
from 1977 to 1982 and 1983.
The apparent decline in the share of multinationals in U.S. exports
reflects, to some degree, changes in the list of multinational firms. The cutoff
point below which full data for affiliates did not have to be reported was
increased from $500,000 in 1977 to $3 million in 1982. Any parent firm with no
affiliates above the cutoff size was exempt from reporting. Therefore, there
may have been some illusory reduction in the list of parent firms. However,
there was also some real movement of firms away from overseas activity, and we
are not sure at this point how much of the apparent decline in participation
in overseas activity is real and how much is an artifact of the change in
reporting requirements.
Another parallel between the Swedish and U.S. multinationals is the rise
in shares of world exports accounted for by their affiliates. That share
increased rapidly until at least the mid—1970's in both countries. There was
some slowdown in the 1974-78 period in Sweden and no change for U.S. majority-
owned affiliates between 1977 and 1982.— 12—
Share(%)ofMajority-Owned Affiliates in World











aRatio comparable to 1957 is 7.9
Source: Lipsey and Kravis (1986) and Appendix Table S-2
This rapid rise in the affiliates' share of world trade while that of the
multinationals as a whole was increasing slowly or holding steady implies that
multinationals in both countries were shifting their production for export,
in percentage terms, from their home countries to the host countries in which
their affiliates were operating.
Share (%)ofMajority-Owned Affiliates in












Source: Lipsey and Kravis (1986) and Appendix Tables S-2 and S-3
Among U.S. multinationals, there was a large shift toward exporting from
affiliates between 1966 and 1977 but little change in the next fiveyears.— 13-
Theshift to exporting from foreign affiliate production rather than from home
production was even stronger for Swedish firms than for U.S. firms, but it
started from a much lower base. The share of multinational firm exports coming
from affiliates was much lower throughout the period for Swedish firms,
starting from a quarter of the U.S. share in 1965. The lower ratio for
Swedish firms was not primarily the result of a greater export orientation of
U.S. affiliates than of Swedish affiliates, although the U.S. affiliates were
somewhat more export oriented (exports were 31 per cent of U.S. affiliates'
sales in 1977 as compared to 24 per cent for Swedish affiliates in 1978). The
explanation is to be found in the greater export orientation of Swedish
parents than of U.S. parents. Over 50 per cent of Swedish parents' sales were
exported in 1978, while U.S. parents exported less than 10 per cent of their
sales in 1977. This divergence between the Swedish and U.S. parents appears
despite the omission from the Swedish data of parents with only sales affi-
liates abroad. This difference may be one explanation of the high share of
Swedish foreign investment in "marketing activities" that was reported in
Eliasson et al. (1985). However, the increase in affiliate shares of Swedish
multinationals' exports was notable: an 84 per cent jump for Swedish multina-
tionals as a group and almost a doubling among the 28 large firms.
Competitiveness Within Industry Groups
The declines in the competitiveness of the U.S. and Sweden, as mani-
fested in their falling shares of world exports during the decade or so
ending in the late 1970's, were reflected in similar declines within broad
industry groups.
3See also the discussion in Swedenborg (1979, Chapter 3). The share of
affiliates in exports of Swedish multinationals would have been even lower if





1978 1977 19821978 1977 1982 1978/1965
1965 1966 19661965 1966 1966
.74 .78 .82 .73 .81 .77 .71 .69
.67 .69 .75 .68 .70 .79 1.02 1.04
.56 .57 .69 .56 .56 .68 .94 .94
.69 .75 .84 .72 .78 .90 .81 .84
.70 .77 .90 .72 .78 .93 .80 .82
.70 .73 .78 .77 .80 .88 .85 .94
.73 .73 .67 .75 .75 .76 .72 .73
.79 .79 .86 .87 .87 .98 .66 .73
.74 .76 .81 .76 .77 .85 .78 .80
bDeveld market economies
Food and Kindred Products in Swedish data
Overall, the competitiveness of Swedish manufacturing declined a little less
during that decade than that of the U.S., and much less in chemicals (where it
actually increased), metals, and electrical machinery. The roughly equivalent
performance in manufactured goods as a whole suggests, as will be discussed
later, that U.S. comparative advantage was tilted more than that of Sweden
towards industries growing faster in world trade.
The performance of both countries looks somewhat more favorable com-
pared with that of developed countries than in comparison with all market
economies, because the developing countries were expanding their exports of
manufactures more rapidly than the developed ones. That was the casepar-
ticularly for electrical machinery and other manufacturing. Relative to deve—
— 14—
Food and Kindred ProductsC









cTobacco products included with
and with Other Mfg. in U.S. data
Source: Appendix Table S-15— 15—
lopedcountries, Sweden's share in chemicals exports rose by four percentage
points and it fell by only six percentage points in metals and electrical
machinery, the "best" performing Swedish industries in this sense. In the
case of the U.S. it was the two machinery industries that held their shares
best in most comparisons and the metals industries that fared the worst. The
extension of the U.S. data to 1982 produced an improvement for the U.S. not
only overall but also in most industry groups.
Our main interest in these country competitiveness measures is in the
comparison with those for the two countries' multinational firms, shown
below. As was pointed out earlier, U.S.-based multinationals' shares in
world manufacturing exports were essentially stable while the Swedish
multinationals' shares increased. However, the U.S. multinationals' shares
probably come closer to representing the competitiveness of a fixed or even
declining group of firms; the rising share of Swedish-based firms may include
some effects of shifts into multinational status by Swedish firms.- 16-
Changesin Shares of U.S. and Swedish Multinationals in
World8 and Developed_Countryb Exports of Manufactures





Foods and Kindred Prod.C .961.041.081.08 5.00 4.67
Chemicals and Allied Prod. 1.00 1.11 1.04 1.17 1.49 1.54
Metals .94 .94 .90 .97 1.07 1.07
Machinery .91 .92 .87 .90 .88 .93
Nonelectrical NA NA NA NA .89 .91
Electrical NA NA NA NA .85 .94
Transport Equipment .87 .79 .88 .81 1.25 1.29
Other Mfg.C .99 .941.061.05 1.17 1.29
All Mfg. .99 .99 .99 1.01 1.14 1.17
aAll market economies bDeveloped market economies
CTobacco products included with Food and Kindred Products in Swedish data
and with Other Mfg. in U.S. data.
Source: Appendix Table S-16
The industry group in which U.S.-multinationals' share declined substan-
tially relative to the world and to developed countries was transport equip-
ment, especially in the longer span to 1982. Over that period, when the U.S.
as a country lost as much as a third of its market share in a couple of
industry groups and some share in all of them, U.S. multinationals increased
their shares relative to developed countries in three of the groups by five
percent or more, held their share within three per cent in another, and lost
almost 20 per cent in only one group. Swedish multinationals gained strongly
relative to the world and to other developed countries in five groups
(although from extremely low initial shares of under one half of one per cent— 17—
intwo of them) and lost only in the machinery industries, the groups in which
their shares were initially largest.
We can compare the changes in competitiveness of each country's
multinationals with those of their home countries by taking ratios of
changes in multinationals' shares to the changes in shares of the countries
in which they are based. In both countries, and in all the industry groups,
Foods & Kindred Products










Source: Two previous text tables.
Changes in Multinationals' Shares of World
Exports Relative to













with one exception, the multinational firms' export shares increased rela-
tive to those of their home countries. The margins were often wide, and were
mostly larger for Swedish firms than for U.S. firms. The exceptions were
chemicals, metals and machinery. In the case of metals, Swedish multina-









exportshares, but the decline for the U.S. as a country was so much greater
than that for Sweden that the margin over the home country was larger for U.S.
firms. In the case of machinery, U.S. and Swedish firms lost shares by simi-
lar amounts but the U.S. as a country lost market share more severely than
Sweden did.
In general, multinationals from both Sweden and the U.S. fared better
than their home countries in just about every industry group. The margins
tended to be largest in groups where the home countries' shares fell the
most, although that was not universal. The changes in multinationals'
shares tended to be smaller than those in home-country shares, perhaps
because the multinationals had the flexibility to shift production from
higher-cost or increasing-cost locations to cheaper ones.
The Comparative Advantage of U.S. and Swedish Multinationals
We can characterize the comparative advantages of U.S. and Swedish multina-
tionals relative to each other and to their home countries by the distributions
of their exports. We cannot compare them with multinationals based in other
countries on the basis of exports because the data are not available, but we
can compare them with other multinationals on the basis of their activities in
Sweden and in the U.S. In this section we ask three questions. First, what corn-
parative advantages distinguish U.S. multinationals from Swedish ones? The
second question is, what are the comparative advantages of Swedish and U.S.
multinationals relative to their own countries? That is, what distinguishes
them from other firms of the same nationality? Finally, what comparative advan-
tages do U.S. and Swedish multinationals have relative to multinationals from
other countries?— 19-
Wecan compare the industry distribution of Swedish and U.S. multina-
tionals' exports for 1977 and 1978, the closest pair of years for which both
countries' data are available.
Industry Distribution ()ofManufactures
Exports by Multinationals Based in







Transport Equipment 30.6 24.2
Other Manufacturing 15.4 27.6
Source: Appendix Table S-14
U.S. multinationals appear to have had a relatively stronger position in the
food, chemical, and motor vehicle industries, while Swedish multinationals
were oriented more towards metals industries and other manufacturing, the
latter group including the traditional Swedish wood and paper and related
industries.4
To some extent, this comparison reflects the differing comparative advan-
tages of the home countries for two reasons. One is that the firms do have
large parts of their operations in their home countries, perhaps for political
or historical reasons, and exports from home production are included here. A
second is that the firm comparative advantages that are carried to foreign
countries may reflect current or past home-country comparative advantages
because the firms have absorbed these through learning-by-doing.
41n order to be placed in a specific industry, a Swedish multinational
must have at least 60 per cent of its total sales in that industry. Swedish
parents that do not fulfill this requirement are classified as "mixed firms"
and are included in "other manufacturing." This means that we overstate the
Swedish multinationals' position in other manufacturing by some 4 to 5 percen—- 20—
Thatthe countries differ a good deal in their comparative advantages
is indicated by their export patterns. In particular, the U.S., as a
Industry Distribution (%)of
Manufactures Exports from







Transport Equipment 23.7 19.7
Other Manufacturing 18.3 32.1
Source: Appendix Table S-6 and Lipsey and Kravis (1986).
country, relative to Sweden, seems to have comparative advantages in foods,
chemicals, and transport equipment, and Sweden in metals and other manufac-
turing. However, the two countries' machinery industries both account for
roughly 30 per cent of manufactured exports, about two thirds non-electrical
machinery and one third electrical machinery. Some of the differences between
the two sets of multinationals thus seem to reflect the country differences.
Another way of looking at the comparative advantages of the two
countries' firms is to compare U.S. multinationals' comparative advantage
relative to the U.S. as a country with Swedish firms' comparativeadvantage
relative to Sweden. In other words, in which industries do U.S. and Swedish
multinationals have comparative advantages beyond what they draw from their
national origins?
tage points, according to our rough calculations.— 21—
Shareof Industry in Multinational
Firm Exports Relative to Share in
Country Exports







Transport Equipment 1.29 1.23
Other Manufacturing .84 .86
Source: Two preceding text tables.
Both countries' multinational firms seem to possess some comparative advantage
relative to their home countries in transport equipment and electrical
machinery and equipment, and comparative disadvantages in foods and other
manufacturing. There were some contrasts between the two countries. U.S., but
not Swedish, multinationals appeared to have some comparative advantage over
their home countries in chemicals and some comparative disadvantage in metals
and non-electrical machinery.
We have two sets of observations on the comparative advantage of U.S. and
Swedish multinationals relative to those of other countries. One is a com-
parison between the operations in the U.S. of Swedish multinationals and those
from other countries. The second is a comparison between the operations of U.S.
and non-U.S. multinationals in Sweden.
The most distinctive characteristic of Swedish-owned manufacturing
enterprises in the U.S. was their extreme concentration in the machinery
industry. Almost three quarters of the sales of Swedish-owned manufacturing
enterprises in the U.S. were in that group in 1980, as compared with about a— 22—
fifthfor all foreign affiliates and all affiliates from developed countries
(Appendix Table S-b). Most of the other Swedish affiliate sales were in metals,
a little below the average share, and in other manufacturing, far below the
average. Concentration on machinery was a little lower measured by employment
and considerably lower, but still high, measured by assets (Appendix Tables S-8
and S-9). The degree of concentration was not only high for the machinery
industry; it was high for any industry. The highest degree of concentration in
an industry other than machinery was Germany's in chemicals, at about 60 per
cent. Most of. the industry concentrations were a third or less of any country's
total direct investment assets.
Another way of describing the strength of Swedish firms' concentration on
machinery among their direct investments in the U.S. is that it was 3 1/2
times that of all countries' firms combined. That was a much larger deviation
from the world pattern than that of Germany in chemicals, which was a little
more than twice the world average. The other side of this concentration was
that the shares of Swedish—owned affiliate sales in industry groups other than
machinery were far below the world averages. The share of Swedish affiliate
sales that were in the food products and chemicals industries in particular
was extremely low, under 5 per cent as compared with over 40 per cent for all
countries combined.
U.S. multinationals in Sweden were also heavily concentrated in the machi-
nery industry, particularly non—electrical machinery. Almost 40 per cent of
their sales were in that group in 1970, as compared with only 5 per cent for
foreign affiliates based in other countries (Appendix Table S-17). Compared to
the other foreign-owned manufacturing affiliates in Sweden, U.S. firms were also— 23—
strongerin chemicals but weaker in foods, electrical machinery, and other manu-
facturing. In transport equipment, there is no foreign participation at all in
the Swedish market. Foreign firms -in this industry do not seem to possess enough
competitive strength to compete with Swedish firms on the latter's home market.
Since Samuelsson (1977) provides data on shares in Swedish output for 126
5—digit SNI industries in 1970, we can attempt to distinguish between the
industry characteristics associated with high U.S. shares and those associated
with high shares of non-U.S. multinationals to discover what factors underlie
U.S. multinationals' comparative advantages relative to multinationals from
other countries aside from Sweden. We relate U.S. and other multinationals'
shares to three industry characteristics: ratios of technical and sales
employment to total employment as measures of the skill or technical intensity,
and the marketing intensity of the industry and the average value added per
establishment, as an indicator of scale economies.
The equationsa are:
Country of Technical Employees Sales EmployeesValue Added
asof Total as of per -2 Ownership Employees Total Employees Establishment R F
(1) U.S. 1.41 -.95 .01 .4811.20
(2.38)b (.78) (3.39)
(2) Other .75 3.21 .00 .4814.36
(2.07) (6.04) (.33)
aArithmetic equations. The fit of long equations was relatively poor.
bt..statistics in parentheses.- 24-
Theequations suggest that skill intensity or technical complexity was
more important for U.S. multinationals than for those from other countries.
Sales effort or marketing intensity, on the other hand, was important for
non-U.S. multinationals but not at all for those from the U.S. Our indicator
of the existence of economies of scale in an industry was significantonly for
U.S. firms.
These results suggest that the comparative advantage of U.S. firms, as
compared to those of other countries, is based on high skill intensity or
technical complexity and on economies of scale. The comparative advantage of
non-U.S. multinationals is based partly on the same technical characteristics
but more strongly on sales effort or marketing intensity.
Comparative AdvantaQe, Growth in Demand, and Overall Competitiveness
Changes in the overall competitiveness of countries and their multinatio-
nals can be thought of as consisting of several elements. One ischanges in
their competitiveness within industries. A second is their comparative advan-
tage, which determines the extent to which they produce and export in each
industry. The third is the rate at which world trade grows in each industry.
We have examined the first two factors in the preceding sections. Herewe take
up the last link in the chain.— 25-
Growthin Aggregate Market Economy Exports
1977 1978 1982
1966 1965 1966
Foods and Kindred Products 4.67a 6.54a
Chemicals and Allied Products 5.72 7.85 9.86
Metals 4.62 6.18 6.87
Machinery 6.00 8.26 9.87
Non—Electrical 5.43 7.51 8.72
Electrical 7.16 9.78 12.21
Transport Equipment 6.82 9.15 10.56
Other Mfg. 5•21b 705a
Total Mfg. 5.49 7.34 8.59
aExciuding tobacco products blncluding tobacco products
Source: Appendix Table S—13
Whatever the period chosen for measuring growth rates, the two industry
groups with the fastest rates of export growth are electrical machinery and
transport equipment, followed by chemicals. Non—electrical machinery exports
grew at close to the average rate, and the whole machinery group at somewhat
above the average. Other manufacturing grew at a below average rate, and foods
and metals at the lowest rates, far below the average.
For both Sweden and the U.S., the distribution of exports in 1965 was
oriented towards industries that enjoyed above-average export growth in the
next 13 years. If their exports in each industry had grown in the next 13 years
at the world average rate, Swedish exports in 1978 would have been 7.5 times
their 1965 value and U.S. exports 7.6 times the initial value, as compared
with a world multiple of 735 In fact, Swedish exports in 1978 were only 5.7
times the 1965 level, and the growth in U.S. exports was even slower. Thus,
the initial comparative advantages of the two countries do not explain their
relatively slow export growth.
5me use of broad industry groups for the calculation of constant-share
growth probably overstates the exected growth for Sweden because within the- 26-
Growthof Manufactured Exports of All
Market Economies, the U.S., Sweden,
and U.S. and Swedish Multinationals
Actual and Constant Share
1978/1965
Actual Constant Share
All Market Economies 7.34
Sweden 5.73 7.52
U.S. 5.40 7.62
Swedish multinationals 8.42 7.73
197 7/1966
Actual Constant Share
All Market Economies 5.49
U.S. 4.16 5.65
U.S. multinationals 5.43 5.87
1982/1966
Actual Constant Share
All Market Economies 8.59
U.S. 7.02 8.99
U.S. multinationals 8.59 9.37
Source: Appendix Tables S-12, S-13, and S-l4
The comparative advantage of Swedish multinational firms, in their world-
wide activities, was tilted a little more toward rapidly growing export
industries than that of Sweden. If the multinationals' exports had grown at
the average rate for their industries, their exports would have reached 7.7
times the 1965 level. The bias towards high export growth was strongest for
the U.S. multinationals. If they had held their 1966 shares within
industries, they would have reached almost 6 times their 1966 level by 1977,
as compared with the world average of 5.5. By 1982, the 1966 shares would have
implied exports 9.4 times the 1966 level, as compared to the actual world
highest—growth industry groups, electrical machinery and transport equipment,
Sweden had low shares of the fastest-growing subgroups, electronic equipment,
and motor vehicles, in 1965.— 27-
ratioof 8.6.
It is clear, then, that the stability in the U.S. firms' share of world
manufactured exports was a combination of two elements: a concentration of acti-
vity in relatively fast-growth industry groups, combined with some loss of
ground within the groups. We can see that from the fact that the actual ratio
for U.S. multinationals, 1977/1966, was 5.4 as compared with 5.9 they would
have had with constant shares in each industry, and the actual ratio in
1982/1966 was 8.6 as compared with the hypothetical ratio of over 9.4.
The story is different for Swedish multinationals. Their share of world
exports grew faster than it would have if they had retained their 1965 shares
in each industry. The multiple for their exports was 8.4 compared with the 7.7
they would have had with constant industry shares.
As in the earlier discussion, the problem in interpreting the Swedish
results is that we do not know what part of the high actual growth in
multinationals' exports came from the shift of individual firms into multina-
tional status, a factor we believe was not important in this period for the
U.S. multinationals' share. We will not be able to make the distinction bet-
ween the results of a shift of firms to multinationality and rising com-
petitiveness with confidence until we can examine the trends for a fixed panel
of firms.
Changes in the Comparative Advantages of the U.S. and Sweden and their Firms
The direction of changes in country comparative advantage can be
summarized by the shifts in the proportions of exports coming from each
industry sector. Both Sweden and the U.S. were shifting the composition of- 28-




Foods .81 .73 .67 .91
Chemicals 1.14 1.15 1.06 1.60
Metals .81 .80 .63 1.99
Machinery
Non-electrical 1.05 1.04 1.10 1.04
Electrical 1.32 1.43 1.40 1.51
Transport Equipment 1.26 1.26 1.03 1.14
Other Manufacturing .87 .94 1.03 .78
Source: Appendix Table S-li
their exports towards electrical machinery, transport equipment, and chemicals
which were, as mentioned earlier, the fastest—growing sectors. In each case,
the shift was more extensive in Sweden than in the U.S. and more rapid than
the world and developed-country shift -in chemicals (from a very low initial
share) and in electrical machinery. The rest of the world was shifting more
rapidly toward transport equipment than either of the two countries, but
within that group, Sweden was moving rapidly into the fast-growing motor
vehicles subgroup.
Swedish and U.S. multinational firms were both shifting towards chemicals
and transport equipment between the mid-1960's and the late 1970's, and both
were shifting out of metals, but while Swedish firms were shifting more
rapidly than the world or developed countries as a group, U.S. firms were
moving less quickly in this direction. Multinationals from both countries, but









Source: Appendix Tables S-il and S-14
Finally, we may ask whether, given these changes in the industry distribu-
tion of exports, the U.S., Sweden and their firms were still, in 1977-78, more
oriented than the world towards the fast-growth industries of the previous
decade. If the composition of exports in 1965/66 had been that of 1977/78 for
the U.S., Sweden, their firms, and the world, and if the industry export
growth rates of the 1965/66 -1977/78period had been as they were, the
constant-share growth rates would have been as follows:
Constant Share Export Growth, 1965—1978 and 1966—77,
Assuming 1965, 1966, 1977, and 1978 Industry
Distribution of Exports
Export Distribution




Changes in Industry Shares































Source: Appendix Tables S-il, S-12, and S-13.
At the end of the period, Sweden, the U.S., and their multinationals all





growth.Both countries' multinationals remained more biased toward export
growth than their countries, and the U.S. and its multinationals more biased
than Sweden and its multinationals. The margin over the world constant-share
growth rate decreased for U.S. and Swedish multinationals and for Sweden as a
country, but increased for the U.S. Thus, taking account of all movements into
and out of the various industry groups, we find that the world as a wholewas
restructuring faster than Swedish and U.S. mutlinationals and Sweden as a
whole, but that the U.S. kept up with, or even a little ahead of, the rest of
the world.
Concluding Remarks
The evidence from this study shows the importance in analyses of com-
petitiveness and comparative advantages, of taking into account the implica-
tions of the mobility of capital, technology and other factors of production
within multinationals. While the U.S. and Sweden both lost more than 20per
cent of their shares of world and developed countries' exports of manufactures
over the 15 years or so after the mid-1960's, the export shares of their
multinational firms stayed fairly stable or even increased. The mult-ina-
tionals, while increasing their shares of home-country exports, shifted their
production for export in percentage terms from their home countries to the
host countries in which their affiliates were located. Thesedevelopments
suggest that the declining competitiveness of the U.S. and Sweden was not due
mainly to deterioration in the innovativeness or inventiveness of American and
Swedish firms or declines in their management ability or in their tech-
nological capabilities. Rather, one should probably look for explanations of
declining country competitiveness in events specific to the countries, such as- 31-
theirmacro-economic policies.
The finding that firms have done better than their home countries is
strengthened when we look at different industry groups. In both the U.S. and
Sweden, and in all industry groups, with one exception, the multinationals'
export shares increased relative to those of their home countries. The margins
were often wide, and were mostly larger for Swedish firms than for U.S. firms.
The margins in favor of the multinational firms tended to be largest ingroups
where the home countries' shares fell the most, although that was not
universal. The changes in multinationals' shares of world exports tended to be
smaller than those in home country shares, perhaps because the multinationals
had the flexibility to shift production from higher-cost or increasing-cost
locations to cheaper ones.
Part of the explanation for the growth of each country's exports and those
of its multinationals is the initial composition of exports, or the com-
parative advantages of the countries and their companies. The comparative
advantages of Sweden and the U.S. and their multinationals were skewed, in the
mid-1960's, to industries that were to enjoy rapid worldwide export growth in
the next decade or so. Despite these comparative advantages, the exports of
both countries fell far behind world export growth. The declines may be
related, to some extent, to the distribution of each country's exports within
these broad industry groups, a subject for future investigation.
The comparative advantages of multinational firms in both countries were
biased toward fast—growth industries even more than those of the countries
themselves, and that fact partly accounted for the better export performance
of the multinationals relative to their home countries. However, the restruc-- 32-
turingof the two countries' economies toward faster-growing industries moved
more rapidly in the decade after the mid-1960's than that of the multina-
tionals.
In general, despite differences between the U.S. and Sweden, the basic
story we find is quite similar. An implication for government policy, con-
firmed here for both Sweden and the U.S., is that a country's competitiveness
can behave very differently from that of firms that are based in the country
but produce abroad as well. National policies aimed at improving the com-
petitiveness of a country may fail if they involve creating, or reducing the
cost of, assets that improve the competitiveness of the country's firms but
can be exploited as well by producing abroad as by producing at home. Thus,
subsidies to R & 0, to innovation, or to management or technical training
might give little encouragement to production at home if the assets created
move easily across national borders within firms.
Aside from these similarities between the U.S. and Swedish experience,
there were also some notable differences. One was that the share ofexports
originating in affiliates was lower for Sweden than for the U.S. To a large
extent, this difference in the siting of export production reflected the much
greater export orientation of Swedish parents relative to U.S. parents, presu-
niably a consequence of the relatively small size of the Swedish domestic
market.
Another difference in performance between U.S. and Swedish multinationals
was that while the U.S. firms' share in world manufacturing exports remained
stable over the studied period, the Swedish firms' share roseby 14 per cent.
We are so far notin a position to saywhether this was because Swedish firms— 33—
increasedtheir competitiveness more than U.S. firms or because there was a
higher conversion of Swedish firms into multinational status.
It is often suggested that multinational firms are relatively immune to
controls by their home governments because they are free to move their produc-
tion from one jurisdiction to another. At least as far as export production is
concerned, this may be less true for Swedish multinationals than for U.S.
multinationals. The reason is that while almost half of the exports by U.S.
firms originate in their overseas affiliates, 80 per cent of Swedish
multinationals' exports originate in Sweden. The Swedish firms may therefore
be more vulnerable not only to home-country controls but also to changes in
home-country macroeconomic policy.- 34-
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AppendixTable S-i
Estimates of World (Market Economy)
Exports of Manufactures, 1965, 1970, 1974, and
(Unit: $million)a
1978












am this and the following tables, Swedish Kroner
U.S. dollars by the exchange rate used in the UN
Trade Statistics
have been converted into
Yearbook of International
bUN Trade Tapes
CSamuelsson (1977) and Statistiska Meddelanden, F 1977:7 and F 1981:7
dThe IUI Survey Data on Swedish Manufacturing Investment Abroad
eEst.imated from employment of minority—owned affiliates by assuming that the
ratio of exports to employment was the same in minority-owned affiliates as
in majority-owned affiliates in the same industry.
Exports, by GeoQraphical Areab
1. World (Market Economies)
2. Developed Countries
3. Sweden






























10. " , ofwhich LDCs
3,465 5,96313,99019,435
1,695 3,770 8,703 12,771
11. Minority—owned affil.
from host countriese
12. Parents and majority-owned affil.,
total 1,891 4,30810,34915,816
13. Parents and majority-owned affil.,
in DCs 1,883 4,29010,29615,721
14. Parents and all affil., total 1,931 4,40810,64916,316
Swedish owned firms
15. All Swedish-owned firms +
majority-owned affil., total 3,661 6,50115,63622,480
16. U , DCs 3,653 6,48315,58322,385
17. All Swedish—owned firms, total 3,701 6,60115,93622,980- 37-
AppendixTable S-2
Indicators of the Share of Sweden, Swedish Firms and Swedish Multinational
Enterprises in World Exports of Manufactured Goods,
1965, 1970, 1974, and 1978
Exrts from Sweden
1. of World Exports
2.% of DC Exports
3.08 2.96 2.89 2.41
3.40 3.29 3.22 2.72
Exports by Swedish Firms
mci. Majority-Owned Aff.
3. of World Exports
4. of DC Exports
3.13 3.03 3.04 2.62
3.44 3.35 3.38 2.95
Exports by Swedish Firms
md.AllAffiliates
5. % of World Exports
6. of DC Exports
3.17 3.07 3.09 2.68
3.48 3.41 3.44 3.01
Exports by Swedish MNCs
mci. All Affiliates
10. of World Exports
Exports by Swedish Majority-
Owned Affiliates
14. of World Exports
other than Swedish
15. of DC Exports other than Swedish
16. of Swedish Parent and
Majority Exports
17. of Swedish Firms Exports
1.65 2.05 2.07 1.90
0.17 0.26 0.33 0.36
0.18 0.28 0.36 0.40
10.3612.4915.9019.25
5.30 8.1510.33 13.25
1965 1970 1974 1978
ExportsbySwedish MNCs
Majority-Owned Aff.
World Exports 1.62 2.01 2.01 1.84
md.
7. of
8.%ofDC Exports 1.77 2.22 2.23 2.07
9. ofLDC Exports 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.10
ExportsbySwedish MNCs
1.45 1.76 1.69 1.49
(Parents)from Sweden
11. 9ofWorld Exports
12. ofDC Exports 1.601.5 1.89 1.68
13. %ofSwedish Exports 47.04 59.3258.5561.84
18.%ofWorld Exportsotherthan Swed. 0.21 0.31 0.39 0.42
19. ofSwedish MNCsExports 12.2214.4718.2721.73
20.% of Swedish Firms Exports 6.38 9.6712.2115.43
All Data are from Appendix Table S-i.- 38
Appendix Table S-3
Indicators of the Share of 28 Swedish Multinational Enterprisesa
in World Exports of Manufactured Goods, 1965, 1978, and 1983
1965 1978 1983
Exports by Parents from Sweden
1.09 1.07 1.07 1. of World Exports
2. 9 of DC Exports 1.20 1.20 1.26
3. of Swedish Exports 35.3 44.6 54.0
4. of Total Sw. MNC (parent)Exports
from Sweden 74.5 70.6 N.A.
Exports by Swedish MNCs
1.21 1.32 N.A.
md. Majority-Owned Aff.
5. of World Exports
6. of DC Exports 1.33 1.49 N.A.
Exports by Majority-Owned Aff.
0.12 0.25 N.A. 7. % of World Exports
8. % of DC Exports 0.13 0.28 N.A.
9. of Swedish Parent and Majority Exports 9.66 18.89 N.A.
a-rhis sample covers 28 Swedish multinationals which were multinationals
throughout the period.
Sources: UN trade tapes, the IUI Survey Data on Swedish Manufacturing
Investment Abroad and Sveriges Största Företa (1983).- 39-
AppendixTable S—4
Shares of The U.S. and Sweden in World Output
aKravis and Lipsey (1984), pp. 140-141
bSummers and Heston (1984)
Clerms of trade
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
Real GOP in Billions of International Dollarsa
World 3,9885,0956,5818,065 9,822
Centrally-planned economies 1,002 1,2541,6702,152 2,628
Market economies 2,9863,8414,911 5,913 7,194
Industrial countries 2,1422,761 3,4744,040 4,795
U.S.
Real GOP per capitab ($)












Real GDP ($billion) 939 1,1851,358 1,523 1,797
Real GOP adj. for 1/iC 949 1,2001,382 1,523 1,770
Asof market economies
Real GDP 31.4 30.9 27.7 25.8 25.0
Real GOP adj. for 1/IC changes 31.8 31.2 28.1 25.8 24.6
Asof industrial countries
Real GOP 43.8 42.9 39.1 37.7 37.5
Real GDP adj. for i/IC changes 44.3 43.5 39.8 37.7 36.9
Sweden
Real GOP per capitab 6,749 7,142
Real GOP per capita adj. for I/ICchangesb 6,749 6,779
Populationb 8,190 8,260
Real GOP 55.3 59.0
Real GOP adj. for I/Is changes 55.3 56.0
Asof market economies
Real GOP 1.04 1.05
Real GOP adj. for 1/ic changes 1.05 1.04
As % of industrial countries
Real GDP 1.45 1.46 1.39 1.37 1.23






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Industry Distribution of Exports of Manufactures From Sweden by
Swedish Multinationals and by Other Firms




Mfg. FoodsChemicalsMetalstrical trical EquipmentMfg.
1965
Sweden ioo.o 2.7 4.2 14.3 17.5 6.4 16.0 39.0 Swedish Parents 100.0 .06 2.6 17.3 19.4 12.7 19.0 29.2
Other Firms 100.0 5.0 5.6 11.6 15.8 .9 13.3 47.9 Swedish Parents
asof Sweden 47.0 1.0 29.1 57.0 52.1 92.7 55.9 35.0
1970
Sweden ioo.o 1.9 4.6 15.3 18.9 7.8 17.0 34.6 Swedish Parents 100.0 .6 2.6 13.6 15.1 11.5 22.8 33.8 Other Firms 100.0 3.9 7.6 17.8 24.4 2.4 8.4 35.4
Swedish Parents
as % of Sweden 59.317.1 33.0 52.8 47.5 87.7 79.8 58.2
1974
Sweden ioo.o 1.9 5.5 14.6 16.9 8.1 16.8 36.4
Swedish Parents 100.0 .4 3.0 12.0 13.4 12.5 22.3 36.4
Other Firms 100.0 3.8 9.0 18.1 21.9 1.8 9.2 36.2
Swedish Parents
as % of Sweden 58.612.8 31.6 48.4 46.4 90.7 77.4 58.7
1978
Sweden ioo.o 1.9 5.5 13.2 18.3 9.5 19.7 -32.1 Swedish Parents 100.0 .3 4.4 14.5 13.6 13.7 22.8 30.7
Other Firms 100.0 4.2 8.1 14.2 26.2 2.3 11.1 33.9
Swedish Parents
as % of Sweden 61.811.5 46.9 62.3 45.7 90.4 76.9 59.4
All data are from Appendix Table S-5- 42-
AppendixTable S-7
Foreign-Owned Manufacturing Affiliates in the U.S., 1974
Distribution of Assets by Industry For Selected Countries and Country Groups
Total
Mfg. Foods Chemicals Metals Machinery
Other
Mfg.
All Countries 100.0 14.7 30.1 17.3 13.4 24.4
Developed Countries 100.0 15.9 27.7 (D) (D) 25.4
Canada & Europe 100.0 16.3 29.1 15.6 13.8 25.2
Canada 100.0 32.4 3.32 19.2 19.4 25.7
Europe 100.0 11.8 36.4 14.6 12.3 25.0
EEC 100.0 8.12 37.8 17.1 10.0 27.0
UK 100.0 9.21 31.2 19.7 6.72 33.2
France 100.0 (0) 27.8 (D) 7.28 16.9
Germany 100.0 0.21 64.0 5.54 8.52 21.7
Netherlands 100.0 10.3 39.0 12.5 15.8 22.5
Other Europe 100.0 25.8 31.0 4.81 20.9 17.5
Sweden 100.0 .39 5.25 9.53 77.0 7.78
Switzerland 100.0 31.3 37.3 3.89 11.5 16.1
Developing Countries100.0 2.70 54.5 (D) (0) 14.9
(D) =Suppressedby source to avoid disclosure.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce (1976).- 43-
AppendixTable S-8
Foreign-Owned Manufacturing Affiliates in the U.S., 1980,










All Countries ioo..o 10.0 31.9




Canada ioo.o 20.1 4.2
19.8 24.3
Europe ioo.o 8.0 41.1
30.2 31.3




Belgium ioo.o 0 n.a. 36.8
France loo.o 2.5 19.4
n.a. n.a.




Italy ioo.o 4.7 0 0.1 64.7
20.3
30.5
Netherlands ioo.o 2.6 49.3




















Sweden ioo.o <.05 6.2
60.8 5.4
Switzerland ioo.o d 44.0
a 56.9
355b





Aust., N.Z., S.Africa100.0 n.a. n.a. 21.4 n.a. 52.2
Developing Countriese 100.0 8.8 9.2 13.0 52.5 16.6
alncluded in Other Mfg.
blncludes Food and Kindred Products.
clncludes Primary and Fabricated Metals dlncluded in Primary and Fabricated Metals
elncluding Australia, New Zealand, and South
Africa
Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce (1983), Table B-8.- 44-
Appendix Table S-9
Foreign—Owned Manufacturing Affiliates in the U.S., 1980
Distribution of Employment by Industry for Selected Countries






Kindred Allied Fabricated Other
TotalProducts Products Metals Machinery Mfg.
All Countries ioo.o 10.9 25.7 10.2 26.2 27.0
Canada, Europe, Japan 100.0 11.2 26.7 9.7 24.7 26.1















































































Aust., N.Z., S. Africa 100.0 n.a. n.a. 19.6 n.a. 53.3
Developing Countriese 100.0 6.6 10.9 20.0 50.3 41.6
alncluded in Other Mfg. blncludes Food and Kindred Products.
clncludes Machinery dlncluded in Chemicals
elncludes Metals Includes Foods and Chemicals
glncluded in Metals hlncludes Foods
Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce (1983), Table F-S.- 45-
AppendixTable 5-10
Foreign-Owned Manufacturing Affiliates in the U.S., 1980
Distribution of Sales by Industry for Selected Countries and County Groups
Chemicals Primary
Food & and and
Kindred Allied Fabricated Other
Total Products Products Metals Machinery Mfg.
All Countries 100.0 12.2 28.7 13.2 21.3 24.5
Canada, Europe, &Japan 100.0 12.1 29.8 13.3 20.0 24.7











France 100.0 1.6 13.9 21.2 2.9 60.4
Germany 100.0 0.5 59.2 8.0 12.4 20.0
Italy 100.0 a 0 0.1 70.2 b




























Switzerland 100.0 c 39.2 425b 10.5 7.8
Japan 100.0 11.4 8.2 26.8 30.1 23.5
Aust., N.Z., S.Africa100.0 n.a. n.a. 19.0 n.a. 54.8
Developing Countries 100.0 13.9 8.9 11.0 47.9 22.6
alncluded in Other Mfg. Clncluded with primary and fabricated metals
blncluding Foods
Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce (1983), Table E—6.- 46-
AppendixTable S-li
Distribution of Exports, by Major Industry Group
Selected Years, 1965-1982










U.S.A. 100.00 9.94 12.64 11.5821.17 7.66 19.20 17.81
Sweden 100.00 2.66 4.19 14.26 17.51 6.45 15.99 38.95
Market Economies100.00 13.60 10.27 15.5913.63 6.76 13.46 26.69
Develpd. E. 100.00 10.03 10.95 15.57 14.92 7.31 14.71 26.51
Develpd. Europe100.00 9.09 11.29 15.74 15.13 7.34 13.99 27.43
1966
U.S.A. 100.00 8.69 12.75 11.9020.85 7.88 19.62 18.30
Sweden 100.00 2.99 4.38 14.9719.32 6.88 13.88 37.58
Market Economies100.00 13.03 10.30 15.53 13.96 6.82 13.78 26.58
Develpd. M. E. 100.00 9.55 11.03 15.1515.34 7.38 15.14 26.41
Develpd. Europe100.00 8.93 11.43 15.2815.86 7.16 13.93 27.41
1970
U.S.A. 100.00 7.19 12.03 10.9921.08 8.12 22.79 17.79
Sweden 100.00 1.94 4.62 15.33 18.89 7.80 16.95 34.47
Market Economies100.00 11.27 10.13 15.64 14.17 7.71 15.58 25.51
Develpd. M. E. 100.00 8.33 10.84 15.14 15.56 8.20 17.15 24.78
Oevelpd. Europe100.00 8.38 11.60 15.16 16.26 7.00 14.24 26.54
1974
U.S.A. 100.00 7.64 12.71 9.37 19.81 8.84 23.05 18.58
Sweden 100.00 1.81 5.48 14.57 16.92 8.07 16.85 36.30
Market Economies100.00 10.20 12.41 16.3113.35 7.90 14.96 24.35
Develpd. M. E. 100.00 8.02 13.11 16.2614.59 8.05 16.41 23.55
Develpd. Europe100.00 8.52 14.55 16.14 15.01 7.61 12.61 25.56
1977
U.S.A. 100.00 7.58 12.64 7.50 20.93 9.94 23.68 18.34
Sweden 100.00 1.83 5.47 13.18 18.34 9.53 19.66 31.99
Market Economies100.00 11.89 10.73 13.00 13.81 8.90 17.14 25.25
Develpd. M. E. 100.00 8.06 11.52 13.3415.33 9.09 18.99 23.68
Develpd. Europe100.00 8.77 12.76 13.39 15.33 8.29 15.23 25.78- 47-
AppendixTable S-li. (continued)
Non-
Elec. Elec. Transp. Other
TotalFoodsa ChemicalsMetals Mach.Mach. Equip. Manuf.b
1978
U.S.A. 100.00 7.85 12.22 7.3520.73 9.70 23.71 18.44
Sweden 100.00 1.81 5.82 14.4118.40 9.38 18.29 31.89
Market Economies 100.0010.57 10.99 13.1113.94 9.00 16.77 25.62
Develpd. M. E. 100.00 8.11 11.76 13.3715.36 9.09 18.41 23.90
Develpd. Europe100.00 8.80 13.06 13.5815.43 8.20 14.77 26.17
1982
U.S.A. 100.00 6.68 13.35 7.3423.2110.75 19.78 18.30
Sweden 100.00 2.41 6.69 14.1618.19 9.71 18.28 30.56
Market Economies 100.00 9.92 11.82 12.4114.17 9.70 16.93 25.06
Develpd. M. E. 100.00 8.13 12.47 12.6115.63 9.64 18.53 22.99
Develpd. Europe100.00 9.28 14.08 12.8115.05 7.86 15.42 25.50
alncluding tobacco products bExciuding tobacco products
Source: UN trade tapes.- 48-
AppendixTable S-12










196520,692 2,056a2,616 2,3975,9664,380 1,585 3,972 3,685b
196622,827 1,985a2,909 2,7176,5594,759 1,800 4,480 4,177b
197794,890 7,194a11,421 7,11529,29119,857 9,43422,466 171403b
1978111,790 8,776a13,663 8,21734,01323,174 10,839 26,509 20,612b
1982160,169 101692a21,389 12,71554,39237,180 17,212 31,676 29,305b
1983155,568 11,070a20,985 11,14850,02332,375 17,648'32,452 29,890b
SWEDEN
1965 3,604 97b 151 514 863 631 232 576 1,403a
1970 6,355 126b 294 974 1,6971,201 496 1,077 2,187a
197414,864 280b 814 2,166 3,7142,515 1,199 2,505 5,385a
197820,651 38gb 1,202 2,9765,7363,799 1,937 3,777 6,571a
198224,567 593a 1,643 3,478 6,8554,470 2,385 4,490 7,509b
aExclud-jng tobacco products
blncluding tobacco products
Source: UN trade tapes and, for 1983, Lipsey and Kravis (1986).- 49-
AppendixTable S-13
Exports of Manufactures by All Market Economies and by Developed Market Economies












































































l97O 193,25016,672 20,942 29,26645,905 30,068 15,837 33,146 47,319
1974a461,37438,107 60,470 75,041 104,480 67,330 37,150 75,704107,572
1g77b630,21650,809 72,578 84,057 153,849 96,587 57,262119,666149,257
l978759,16163,919 89,272101,527 185,578 116,581 68,997139,740179,125
1982b973,84079,145 121,440122,824 246,104 152,254 93,850180,448223,879
1g83b958,83374,426 125,108111,986( 424,122d )223,191
aTobacco products included with foods
bTobacco products included with Other Mfg.
Ccorresponding total for 1982, 457,990
dCorresponding total for 1982, 426,552
Source: UN Trade Tapes and, for 1983, Lipsey and Kravis (1986)- 50-
AppendixTable 5-14
Exports of Manufactures by U.S. and Swedish Multinationals
By Broad Industry Groups, Selected Years, 1965-1983
Total Machinery Transport





























































































































































Source: Lipsey and Kravis (1986) and the IUI Survey Data on Swedish
Manufacturing Abroad— 51-
AppendixTable S—15
Shares (Per Cent) of the U.S. and Sweden In Market Economy and
Developed Market Economy Exports of Manufactures
By Broad Industry Groups, Selected Years, 1965—1983
Total Machinery Transport
Mfg. Foodsa Chemicals Metals Total Non—Elect. Elect. Equip.
Other
Mfg.a






















1965 17.712.7 21.8 13.2 25.1 27.5 20.1 25.3 12.0
1966 17.511.7 21.7 13.4 24.3 26.1 20.2 24.9 12.1
1977 13.39.1 14.9 7.6 18.3 20.1 14.8 18.3 9.6
1978 13.09.4 14.5 7.3 17.3 19.4 14.0 18.4 9.5
1982 14.39.6 16.2 9.2 20.3 23.4 158 16.7, 10.4
1983 13.910.6 15.5 8.3 NA ( 1& ) 10.6
SWEDEN
1965 3.08 .59 1.26 3.66 4.55
1970 2.96 .51 1.35 3.22 4.04
1974 2.89 .52 1.27 3.25 4.25
1978 2.41 .42 1.28 2.63 3.02
1982 2.19 .53 1.24 2.37 2.68
SHAREOFDEVELOPED MARKETECONOMIES' EXPORTS
U.S.
1965 19.5 27.7 20.4 25.4 13.3
1966 19.5 26.3 20.7 25.1 13.4
1977 15.1 20.6 16.5 18.8 11.7












1965 3.40 .88 1.30 3.11 3.66 3.99 2.99 3.69 5.04
1970 3.29 .76 1.40 3.33 3.70 3.99 3.13 3.25 4.62
1974 3.22 .73 1.35 2.89 3.55 3.74 3.23 3.31 5.01
1978 2.72 .61 1.35 2.93 3.09 3.26 2.81 2.70 3.67

























aTobacco products included with Food for Sweden and with Other Mfg. for U.S.
bcorresponding ratio for 1982 is 19.2.
Ccorresponding ratio for 1982 Is 20.6
Source: Appendix Tables S-12 and S—13.- 52-
AppendixTable S—16
Shares of U.S. and Swedish Multinationalsa in Market Economy and
Developed Market Economy Exports of Manufactures




Metals Total Non-Elect. Elect. Equip.
Other
Mfg.
SHARE()OF EXPORTS BY ALL MARKET ECONOMIES
U.S.
1966 17.8 7.8 22.8 8.4 25.2 NA NA 35.9 10.9









7.923.4 22.7 24.5 28., 10.3
6.4 NA ( 25''7C ) 9.8
SWEDEN
1965 1.62 .02 .47 1.70 2.78 2.75 2.85 2.12 1.71
1970 2.01 .09 .56 1.69 2.74 2.71 2.78 2.78 2.54
1974 2.01 .08 .51 1.44 2.76 2.66 2.94 2.89 2.77
1978 1.84 .10 .70 1.82 2.45 2.46 2.43 2.66 2.01
SHARE ()OFEXPORTS BY DEVELOPED MARKET ECONOMIES
U.S.
1966 19.2 9.5 22.8 9.2 25.4 NA NA 36.1 11.8









8.9 22.8 22.8 22.8 29.2, 12.4
7.7 NA ( 261d ) 11.9
SWEDEN
1965 1.78 .03 .48 1.87 2.81 2.77 2.90 2.13 1.89
1970 2.23 .14 .58 1.94 2.80 2.75 2.90 2.81 2.91
1974 2.24 .12 .54 1.62 2.90 2.72 3.22 2.94 3.26
1978 2.08 .14 .74 2.01 2.60 2.52 2.72 2,74 2.44
aparents and majority-owned affiliates in all market economies and in developed
market economies.
bTobacco products included with food for Sweden and with Other Mfg. for U.S.
Ccorresponding ratio for 1982 is 25.3.
dcorresponding ratio for 1982 is 25.5.
Source: Appendix Tables S-13 and S-14- 53—
AppendixTable S-17
U.S. and Other Foreign-Owned Manufacturing Affiliates in Sweden, 1970
Distribution of Sales by Industry





Non—Elect. Machinery 39.6 4.9
Electrical Machinery 12.7 21.7
Transport Equipment 0 0
Other Manufacturing 8.3 20.0
Total 100.0 100.0
Total Sales ($million) 419 633
Source: Samuelsson (1977), Table 2:8, p. 40.
The industry classification has been altered here to match that
of the other tables in this paper.